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I. — INTRODUCTION (1)
The idea that « Institutions matter ! » for economic policy is certainly not a
novel one (Hodgson, 1999). It at least dates back to John Commons (1924) and
to Ronald Coase (1937). In a Walrasian world, « exchange takes place without
any specification of its institutional setting. We have consumers without huma-
nity, firms without organization, and even exchange without markets » (Coase,
2005, p. 200), while, on the contrary, the economists’ view of human nature
should be « of a piece with their treatment of institutions which are central to
their work » (Coase, 1988, p. 5).
The centrality of institutional determinants for economic performance
(Williamson, 2000 ; Coase, 2002) has, however, recently flourished in the eco-
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nomic policy debate. This is testified, among other things by several initiatives
launched either by intergovernmental organizations or foundations, focused on
measuring the impact of institutional framework on growth or competitive-
ness. The « Doing Business » reports published annually by the World Bank
(see www.doingbusiness.org) is just one of the prominent examples in this res-
pect. Recent debates over global financial crises have further renewed the role
of institutional setting and legal standards as « genetic » features of well-per-
forming markets, which is now acknowledged even by one of the Chicago
School’s most eminent scholars (e.g. Posner, 2009).
Beyond these epiphenomena, the rising consensus about the inefficiency of
many direct governmental interventions in the economy, as well as of many
omissions, often imposed by inheritance of specific historic trajectories, has
led to the idea that designing appropriate institutional frameworks should be
the new frontier of policy-making in the hands of governments (La Porta et al.,
1999, 2008). Structural reforms are, indeed, the new horizon of most govern-
ments both in developing/transition countries and in the most advanced. This
can largely be seen as a victory of New Institutional Economics (NIE). The
intervention of such prominent scholars as Douglas North and Joseph Stiglitz
as consultants for major intergovernmental organizations and governments has
played a strong role in changing the thinking of political elites and bureaucra-
cies. In addition, thousands of economists have been working for years in
advising policy-makers in matters of institutional design. The last two Nobel
laureates, and their careful and detailed applied analyses of how governance
structures actually operate in various institutional and transactional contexts,
illustrate this strong movement. The resulting awareness about the institutio-
nal nature of markets has further contributed to enhance cross-fertilization bet-
ween NIE and various applied fields of economics ; such as Industrial
Organization, especially concerning the organization of efficient markets and
the remedies to the so-called « market failures ».
At the same time, beyond the recognition of the causal relationship between
institutional frameworks and the dynamics of the economy, the overall politi-
cal message to be drawn from the wide scholarly NIE literature is not totally
clear today. On the one hand, institutional frameworks are depicted as rules of
the game (North, 1990), but the actual impact of alternative rules as well as
complementarities among them, remain unanswered questions. On the other
hand, while « markets » are no longer naively seen as Walrasian systems of
centralized auctions, the condition to which transactions (and thus, production
and competition) are efficiently performed are still under debate. A compre-
hensive understanding of the institutional frames enabling markets to perform
is still in its infancy.
Taking stock of the past thirty years of developments in this analytical field,
this paper aims at outlining the main policy lessons and recommendations to
be drawn from the field, so as to point out at the same time what the research
agenda is. Since NIE precisely draws from the Coasean perspective that eco-
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nomists should pay attention to the details of the complex issues they are dea-
ling with, and, in particular, to the specific « environmental » conditions of any
economic phenomenon, it might seem quite a challenge to attempt to provide
a general synthesis of such a field since, precisely, most actual policy recom-
mendations insist on the specificities and « local » conditions of the imple-
mentation context (Dixit, 1996 ; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002, 2003). It is impor-
tant, therefore, to clarify our goal and our methodology. First, we want to focus
on what seems to us to be the heart of NIE : the analysis of the relevant insti-
tutional frameworks to generate and organize exchange. Of course, NIE has
been proving to be very powerful to investigate political economy and long-
term development and growth issues on the one hand, as well as contracting
and organizational issues, on the other. Here, we would like to focus on the
subject which seems to unify the works of the founding fathers, such as Coase,
North and Williamson.
That said, we will not limit our attention to the « transaction cost approach
of institutions ». We use the qualification of NIE because we see more com-
plementarity and convergences amongst the various contemporary perspec-
tives analyzing institutions – from incentives theory to behavioral economics
and encompassing law and economics – than we see conflicting or diverging
schools of thought (2). Thus, we interpret NIE as the various contemporary
developments aimed at understanding institutions and organizations through
the lenses of economics, and we try to assess the general policy lessons to be
drawn in terms of organizing exchange. This leads us to identify key tradeoffs
to be taken into consideration when attempting to organize (efficient) markets.
Relevant institutional designs are, as it will be highlighted, highly dependent
upon the context.
We then consider, first, the domains in which NIE identifies potential impact
of institutional tools in terms of organizing markets, namely property rights,
externalities and competition (section 2). Then, we will discuss how NIE sees
the alternative dimensions of the organization of institutional frameworks
(section 3). This will lead us to discuss the elements of balance between
« command and control » and incentives ; public and private ordering ; centra-
lized and decentralized governance ; formal and informal coordination. Taking
stock of the analysis of institutional changes, we will conclude by pointing out
the difficulties highlighted by NIE in reforming institutional frameworks, and
therefore, the difficulties in obtaining the social benefits expected from more
efficient markets.
(2) The understanding of the role played by institutional frameworks in affecting market out-
comes has been recently enriched by the huge progresses made by behavioral and experi-
mental economics on the interaction between human nature, bounded rationality and eco-
nomic choices under given institutional constraints (Simon, 1957 Sunstein, 1999 ;
Arrunada, 2008). For brevity’s sake, we will not touch upon those issues here.
90 REVUE D’ÉCONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE — n°129-130, 1er et 2ème trimestres 2010
II. — THREE PURPOSES OF INSTITUTIONAL TOOLS
2.1. Establishing Property Rights, Managing Externalities, Maintaining
Competition
The development of the literature on the relevant institutional framework for
markets has highlighted that it is useful to contrast alternative purposes of the
institutions framing markets.
The institutional dimensions impacting more particularly the performances
of markets may be considered from two perspectives labeled, respectively, as
the « North-Barzel » and the « Smith-Schumpeter » approaches. While the first
focuses on the fundamental role played by property rights for establishing
incentives to manage economic resources, the second outlines the virtues of
competition, whose dynamics lead to eliminating inefficiencies and to stimu-
late innovation.
Under the North-Barzel perspective (North, 1976, 1989 ; Barzel, 1989, 1997,
2002), the way economics systems perform depends upon property rights ;
understood as the complex set of mutually recognized rights to access, use,
and benefit from resources (3). They define both how agents can make deci-
sions about the use of economic resources, and how they can transfer and rear-
range these rights amongst each other. This is summarized in the idea that an
institutional setting establishes the level of « transaction costs » born by agents
to use resources and exchange them. Establishing a system of property rights
is in itself costly, and the related costs are taken into account in the analysis.
Thus, the « transaction costs approach » of institutions provides a framework
aimed at analyzing the overall impact of alternative institutional settings on the
efficiency in the use of economic resources.
Amongst the results of this approach, it is pointed out that a complete sys-
tem of property rights is prohibitively costly in a world of bounded rationali-
ty, incomplete set of preferences, uncertainty, etc. As Barzel (1997) has
argued : « in order that rights to an asset be complete or perfectly delineated,
both its owner and other individuals potentially interested in the asset must
possess full knowledge of all its valued attributes ». […] When transaction
costs are positive, rights to assets will not be perfectly delineated. The reason
is that, relative to their value, some of the attributes of the assets are costly to
measure. Therefore, the attributes of such assets are not fully known to pers-
pective owners and are often not known to current owner either (pp. 4-5). This
point was originally addressed by Demsetz (1967), who pointed out that
(3) They therefore draw not only from the property right law, but also from contract law, regu-
lations, and more generally from the interplay between formal rules, the way they are
effectively complied with and the informal rules such as customs and social norms. More
on these issues later in the paper.
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changes in knowledge resulting in changes in production functions, market
values, and aspirations generate new techniques, new ways of doing the same
things, and ways of doing new things, « all invoke harmful and beneficial
effects to which society has not been accustomed ». However, as outlined by
Lueck and Miceli (2005), « little work has been done to understand the forces
that determine the optimal complexity of property rights ». Since property
rights systems are inherently incomplete, the institutions in charge of the defi-
nition and enforcement of property rights perform a role in « completing » pro-
perty rights over time, to reduce transaction costs (Libecap, 2002, 2003, 2004).
However conflicting uses over resources cannot be eliminated, externalities
are not fully internalized, and positive transaction costs result in the inefficient
use of some resources, and in attempts by economic players to set up organi-
zational arrangements reducing transaction costs (4).
An additional issue is that « markets » can perform if and only if competi-
tion – either static or dynamic – is lively. From a Smithian-Schumpetarian
perspective, competition is an essential tool of coordination in the sense that it
incites parties to coordinate efficiently (in the aim of becoming jointly more
competitive, or of repeating interactions). It is, therefore, essential for an ins-
titutional framework to deal with competitive issues and to « maintain » com-
petition. Manipulating the definition and the assignment of property rights
(4) The analysis of the incompleteness of property rights comes from a deeper analysis than
the one given here and points out three essential dimensions :
• Incompleteness as the costs of digging out new uses (Barzel, 1997) : « Property rights
are not perfectly defined. In order that rights to an asset be complete or perfectly delinea-
ted, both its owner and other individuals potentially interested in the asset must possess
full knowledge of all its valued attributes. […] When transaction costs are positive, rights
to assets will not be perfectly delineated. The reason is that, relative to their value, some
of the attributes of the assets are costly to measure ».
• Incompleteness as weak enforcement. When enforcement cannot be guaranteed, the
value of the property decreases because the owner discounts the expected value of its right
by the probability of it not being protected in case of violation. Since Adam Smith’s days,
economists have long stressed how a weak protection of property is often thought to be
the root of many developmental problems (North, 1990, 1992) and generally undermines
economic performance by jeopardizing owners’ expectations about use of assets (Libecap,
2003).
• Incompleteness as weak rights’ separateness, Lueck and Miceli (2005) have noted how
in many real world situations, assets are handled with mixed regimes that have to face the
complex articulations of uses and relative rights bundled in the property. They use the
example of a rancher’s land to illustrate the case. They observe that, while the use of the
land for grazing might be private, the use of the stream through the property might be open
access, the underlying oil reservoir may be governed by a unitization contract that mimics
a common property and other regimes might be in use to govern other uses of the asset
land. Different property regimes are needed because for any of these uses of the bundle,
there exists a different optimal ownership of the land. This problem arises from the fact
that land is adjacent to other resources, notably air, water and wildlife stocks, these envi-
ronmental resources are considerably more difficult to divide into individual properties.
[…] owners of land simply « piggy-back » uses of these common resources onto their use
of land (Rose, 1998).
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mainly does it, since such a manipulation can be managed so as to guarantee
open/efficient access and recombinations among economic agents.
Combining the Barzel-North and the Smith-Schumpeter perspectives leads
to point out that institutional frameworks’ purposes could be grouped into
three sets of functions to establish markets : « measuring » (i.e. delineating)
and « distributing » property rights amongst economic agents (section 2.2) ;
managing externalities (section 2.3) ; and guaranteeing the long-term sustaina-
bility of the competitive process (section 2.4).
2.2. Establishing Property Rights
The institutional approach to property rights has highlighted that ownership
is to be intended not as an unquestionably defined right, but rather as an evol-
ving bundle of rights, and the corresponding system of definition/enforcement
of property rights as a complex set of institutions performing (ex ante and ex
post) a specific task aimed at completing property rights (Libecap, 2003). It
results from choices in matters concerning the delineation of rights, and their
modes of distribution among agents. These choices regard both the rules to be
implemented (e.g. the analyses proposed by Menell and Scotchmer, 2007, on
alternative property rights regimes) and the organization of governance
devices that will operate this implementation (e.g. the discussion of the orga-
nization of the titling system for land proposed by Arrunada and Garoupa,
2005). We will discuss in turn, the question of the delineation/measure of pro-
perty rights (section 2.2.1.), of their mode of distribution (section 2.2.2.) and
of their enforcement (section 2.2.3.) ; given the fact that some generic aspects
of the organization of institutional setting – which concern also the establish-
ment of property rights – are discussed in the third section of this paper.
2.2.1. « Measuring » property rights
The first function identifies the transaction costs associated to the definition
of a property rights system. What NIE has clearly outlined in this respect, also
drawing from Law and Economics, is the awareness that a complete definition
of property rights over every economic use attached to a scarce resource would
require infinite transaction costs due to the discovery of every asset attribu-
te/use for each resource at any point in time. As Demsetz (1998) has clarified,
« there is never complete certainty about the scope of allowed and disallowed
uses of resources, so a right-defining and conflict-resolving institution, such as
the court system, the legislature, or some community authority, is inevitably
part of any property right system ». This leads to a trade-off between ex ante
and ex post transaction costs. Property rights attribute to owners a residual
right to control the uses bundled in property, but these uses might be challen-
ged at any time, and need to be confirmed (by private agreements or by
Courts’ decisions) ex post.
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The above trade-off is generated by the fact that the attribution of exclusive
rights of access to a scarce resource may well inhibit efficient access when
there are positive market transaction costs ex post. From a social point of view,
a too « closed » definition of property rights can, therefore, be sub-optimal.
Indeed, on the one hand, the ex ante definition of property rights tends to posi-
tively align incentives of investors in the creation and valorization of
assets (5). However, it might induce inefficient exclusion towards non-owners
when high ex post transaction costs are present. On the other hand, the ex post
definition of property rights minimizes ex ante incentives to invest (due to the
risk of inefficient inclusion), while maximizing ex post incentives by non-
owners. The resulting social dilemma has to be solved in function of the
assessment of the relative impact of investment requests vs. the innovation
potential on the overall economic performance. These are typical types of pro-
blems that economic regulators face when they have to consider access to
« essential facilities » by third parties, either in network industries or in mat-
ters of innovation (hence, protected knowledge).
The other approach that contributed to enlighten the role of property rights
distribution in imperfect institutional settings, characterized by incomplete
contracting around imperfectly unbundled property rights (see below), is the
so-called, « incomplete contract » approach to non-contractible investment
choices (Grossman and Hart, 1986 ; Hart and Moore, 1990 ; Aghion et al.,
1994 ; Hart, 1995). When transactions request specific investments, it is pos-
sible to selectively motivate investors through property right assignment. As
Hart (1995) refers, property rights assign a residual right of control over futu-
re contingencies to the owner. Thus, once identified those agents who mostly
contribute to surplus production, property rights should be assigned to them
with the unpleasant consequence of reducing incentives for non-owners, and,
therefore, reaching only second best outcomes. However, it might generate
another trade-off : while aligning efficient investments on the owner’s behalf,
ownership may actually reduce market efficiency when assets are scarce in the
market, deterring market entry by an efficient non-owner. This is discussed in
section 2.4.
The law and economics literature has also contributed to the analysis of the
efficient way of designing property rights systems by outlining the economic
criteria that should guide the choice between alternative forms of property
rights protection, and particularly between « property rules » and « liability
rules ». The main idea, first outlined by Calabresi and Melamed (1972), and
further refined by Kaplow and Shavell (1995) and by Ayres (2005), is to defi-
ne the degree of ex ante excludability as a function of the costs of protection,
which encompasses ex ante costs of prevention of access, and ex post costs of
(5) The degree of protection of property rights affects owners’ incentives to invest in produc-
tion, in the preservation of existing resources (Shavell, 2004) and to make property-rela-
ted specific investments (Bebchuck, 2001).
94 REVUE D’ÉCONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE — n°129-130, 1er et 2ème trimestres 2010
compensation when access occurs. When the costs of protection are low
enough, then « property rules » should ensure that nonconsensual takings
never occur, thus imposing the highest fine (including non monetary sanc-
tions) on infringers. On the other hand, when the costs of protection are fairly
high, then « liability rules » should dominate : non-owners may have access to
others’ property without consent, but they will have to pay the opportunity cost
to owners. Thus, it is the relative level of the cost of prevention of access ver-
sus the ex post cost of negotiation (which encompasses the assessment of the
opportunity costs and conflict resolution) that defines the effective way of
enforcing property rights. In particular, Kaplow and Shavell (1995) outlined
the superiority of liability rules as default rules of property rights protection
whenever the enforcer has to sustain high transaction costs to extract relevant
information by conflicting parties, since it provides rights incentives for
owners to optimally protect (ex ante) and sue (ex post). Recently, Arrunada
(2011) has shown how liability rules also perform another important function.
It generates confidence in case third parties acquire property rights by dealing
with non-owners (e.g. an agent, a firm’s employee, etc.), which is a very fre-
quent case in an advanced economy.
Parallel to these debates is the one about the bundling/unbundling of pro-
perty rights. Should the rights to all possible/future uses of an asset – another
way to interpret « residual rights » – be ex ante attributed to an « owner »? Or
should a specific right be defined and distributed for each potential use? The
latter solution means, of course, that each time a new possible use is « inven-
ted », a new right should be delineated and granted. The choice between the
two options has a strong impact on the transaction cost born ex post by the
agents. It therefore refers partly to the tradeoff between the ex ante (institutio-
nal) vs. ex post (contractual) measurement of property rights pointed out
above. It is, however, worth to highlight here that the socialization of the deli-
neation of unbundled rights ex ante, which might raise the overall level of tran-
saction costs (because rights are delineated and enforced upon uses of little
value), has the virtue of enabling the development of transparent markets
around the delineated uses of the considered assets. This might therefore favor
efficient use and efficient investments. Think at shared capacities on infra-
structure networks.
2.2.2. Distributing Property Rights
As pointed out by Coase (1960) and many others, the ex-ante repartition of
property rights does not impact efficiency in a world of zero transaction costs,
since it has only distributive effects. Transfers of property rights should allow
an efficient redistribution of assets. This is, of course, different in a world of
positive transaction costs, since only a partial redistribution of capabilities to
use assets will occur ex post, resulting in the inefficient use if the assets were
not properly distributed at the initial stage of property rights repartition.
Then, the dilemma is well known (Bouckaert, 1999). On the one hand, the
« first possession » principle (i.e. either « first claim, first served » or « grand-
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fathering ») leads to over-investment in the competition TO claiming rights of
exclusivity (Anderson and Hill, 1990 ; Barzel, 1968 ; Libecap and Wiggins,
1984 ; Merrill, 1986). This competition might generate an evaporation of the
benefits of the valuation of the resources, as repeatedly demonstrated by case
studies on the inefficiencies of the political processes aimed at lobbying to
gain/protect access to scarce or exhaustible resources (see Libecap 2002,
2010). Moreover, the inefficient use of resources is also a frequent result, since
the better claimer is not always the most efficient exploiter.
On the contrary, « auctions » are, in principle, a much better way of distri-
buting property rights (Lueck, 1995). They raise, however, two types of issues.
First, the so-called winner’s curse effect might arise in common-value auctions
where the winner tends to be the bidder with the most overly optimistic infor-
mation on the value of the asset. If a bidder bids naively, on the basis of pri-
vate information only, this could yield an ex post negative profit that raises
problems of adverse selection, on the one hand, and, on the other, of the ex post
need to reallocate property rights, which is costly. Second, to avoid this type
of negative effect, auctions procedures have to be carefully designed and
managed, both to ensure efficient selection and to avoid collusion among bid-
ders. This might generate substantial transaction costs because the most effi-
cient procedures are the most sophisticated ones that request the highest
amount of effort both from the auctioneer and from the bidders (Milgrom,
1989) (6). Again, positive transaction costs prevent getting the first best, and
there is, therefore, an unavoidable tradeoff between the imperfect benefit/cost
performance of first appropriation and of Auction mechanisms.
2.2.3. Ensuring Compliance and Conflict Settlement
There are two main trade-offs in matters regarding the enforcement of pro-
perty rights. The first is related to the costs of supervising, auditing and moni-
toring (as expressed by the probability of detecting infringements to prevent it)
versus the costs of ex-post conviction, once the right has been violated : ex post
enforcement would impose transaction costs only when it is needed, but it may
generate under-deterrence. This means that prevention should be preferred in
those cases in which the damages generated by infringers would be hardly
compensated ex post.
The second trade-off emerges in relation to the specialization of enforce-
ment. Behind what is often put in the forefront in the Law and Economics lite-
(6) In addition repeated auctions can be inefficient in case of specific investments.
Williamson (1976) has raised several fundamental issues with Demsetz’s monopoly fran-
chise bidding procedure (Demsetz, 1968). Organizing competition for the market is not an
easy task, the world is not static, transaction costs make contracts necessarily incomplete
and switching costs make public authorities and private contractors entering contracts vul-
nerable to ex post contractual opportunism.
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rature, the public vs. private conflict resolution competition lies in an opposi-
tion between generic and specific dispute resolution mechanisms. Indeed, the
literature has outlined that private conflict settlements should be preferred to
public enforcement when parties are able to commit to follow decisions made
by private, say specialized, arbitrators who generally make decisions with
shorter delays, because they benefit from context-specific information and
knowledge. The trade-off, for the collectivity is between increasing speed and
accuracy in controversy resolution, and the social loss of jurisprudence pro-
duction, since private/specific arbitrators will typically not disclose their deci-
sions. Indeed, privacy is one of the advantages of alternative dispute resolu-
tions. Moreover, specialized judgment relies on the specificity of the context,
which makes it of less value per se for other members of the society than moti-
vated generic decisions.
The general conclusion to be drawn from NIE is that property rights systems
are irremediably imperfect and costly. More precisely, property rights can
never be optimally designed, efficiently distributed and perfectly enforced,
which justifies debates and policy actions aiming at amending them, even if it
may have a cost in terms of uncertainty for the economic agents. NIE also
emphasizes the essential elements to be taken into account in terms of the deli-
neation and enforcement of property rights. First, alternative institutional
arrangements impact on who pays for the establishment of property rights,
either the collective, or the owners/users of the resources. Second, decisions in
maters of institutional design relate to whether delineation and enforcement
are performed ex ante or ex post. Making the best choice regarding each
dimension is highly dependent upon the nature of the resources, the level and
nature of information costs, and the efficiency gains to be expected from col-
lective/joint efforts regarding governance (such as economies of scale, scope
or related to specialization).
2.3. Managing Externalities (7)
According to Harold Demsetz (1967), the creation of a property right over
an externality reduces the costs of inducing interacting agents to create each
time a new market for beneficial or harmful effects attached to conflicting uses
over open access resources. However, the emergence of new property rights to
cost effectively exchange « externalities » are not the automatic outcome gene-
rated by the mere existence of the latter. It depends upon the costs-benefits
ratio associated with the definition and enforcement of a system of property
rights. In a positive transaction costs world, it is thus impossible to always
internalize externalities though exchange processes. We explore here the main
lessons to be drawn from NIE in matters of governance of externalities, when
(7) Since the related debates are quite familiar to IO specialists, this point is just summarized
here.
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the property right solution is not available. For simplicity’s sake, three main
domains might be distinguished here : negative externalities, positive ones, and
public goods.
The case of positive externalities entails the possibility of inefficient exclu-
sion of non-owners in circumstances in which the strength of property rights
implies an excessive degree of excludability from access. This encompasses
the case of the tragedy of anti-commons (Heller, 1998) due to an excessive
fragmentation of property rights, as well as the case of excessively broad
(intellectual) property rights that may deter competitors’ entry in downstream
markets. In the latter case, compulsory licensing, or the regulation of royalty
rates, or the imposition of liability rules, or incentives towards mergers may
reduce the inefficient market foreclosure generated by the overprotection gran-
ted to property rights holders (Scherer 1977). As mentioned above, the orga-
nization of mandatory open access to « essential facilities » in network indus-
tries is also a way to deal with inefficient exclusion.
The case of negative externalities is relevant when it involves inefficient
inclusion, i.e. when non-owners enjoy free access to resources protected by
incomplete or weak property rights. The focus on « inefficient » inclusion
reveals that it does not necessarily annihilate private benefits accruing to
owners, as shown by the case of the Coasean lighthouse (Coase, 1974). Even
in some cases, private benefits do increase, as when network effects are invol-
ved (Economides, 1996 ; Shy, 2001). The problem of inefficient inclusion
refers to circumstances in which the public nature of the good reduces expec-
ted private gains for owners, as in the case of the tragedy of the commons
(Hardin, 1968) or of inefficiently weak protection of intellectual property
rights (Landes and Posner, 2003). Beyond action on property rights, incentives
to invest can be managed by systems of rewards and quotas.
Finally, the last domain concerns the management of « public » goods (and
most often « imperfect » public goods). This crosses the trade-off between
incentives and « command-and-control » systems that will be discussed later
(section 3.1), since it involves some form of public intervention. Public good
could be provided either by public bureaus or a state owned entity or by gran-
ting public rewards and/or subsidies to a private firm. In the first case, social
benefits would strictly depend on incentives provided to the producer, espe-
cially when quality matters, in the context of rent-seeking activities. In the
second case, a trade-off emerges between providing strong ex ante incentives
to reward private producers with the risk, however, of inducing moral hazard
and reducing incentives through conditioning rewards to strong ex post audi-
ting/monitoring activities (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). Another possibility for
public goods is to design incentives on the demand side, i.e. to directly trans-
fer monetary payments to final users and let them find, under their own res-
ponsibility, the way to organize production and consumption (Ostrom, 1990).
In matters regarding the management of « market failures », NIE contribu-
ted to pointing out the risk of capture of any form of public intervention. At
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the same time, it recognizes that in a world of positive transaction costs, exter-
nalities and public goods issues cannot be fully solved by creating additional
markets. Policy intervention should, however, rely as much as possible on the
implementation of the logic of the market and competitive incentives, by defi-
ning more appropriately property rights when it is cost effective, and by imple-
menting mechanisms guaranteeing the contestability of economic positions,
and the actual involvement of users in decision-making.
2.4. Managing competition
Since in a competitive world, cartels and unilateral conduct by dominant
firms lead to the hindering of the competitive process, it is relevant to manage
competition policy by « redefining » on occasion property rights, so as to gua-
rantee the effectiveness of the competitive pressure.
One limit of the NIE is that its attention to the efficiency gains of non-market
governance tends to neglect the negative feedback of authority relationships that
bring anticompetitive outcomes due to the reduction of the number of players
(horizontal integration) or to the reduction of the size of competitive markets
(vertical integration). This effect could be further magnified when markets are
not fully transparent and perfectly competitive, since a problem of informatio-
nal inefficiency could emerge due to possible strategic manipulation of infor-
mation. This is the case of markets in which a vertically integrated dominant
firm strategically conveys manipulated information to regulators in order to pro-
tect anti-competitive rents. Competition concerns in industries dominated by
vertically integrated incumbent firms, owning essential facilities, somewhat
inverts the Coasean framework : when the cost of competing in a given relevant
market is determined by incumbent vertical integration, then it is convenient to
« unbundle » the firm’s assets to restore competitors’ incentives.
However, in this case, a new trade-off might emerge between the vertical
separation to restore competition and maintaining the vertical integration to
save transaction costs. This is illustrated by the antitrust remedies aimed at
granting competitors’ access to an essential facility owned by a dominant firm,
the regulatory obligation undoubtedly raises new transaction costs, as the
incumbent firm is obliged to reintroduce the market inside the firm, and the-
refore hinder incentives to efficiently invest, both for the new entrants and for
the incumbent (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy, 2001 ; Joskow, 1991, 2002 ;
Ménard, 2005). This calls for a prudent attitude in applying strong antitrust
remedies under NIE’s lens (Castaldo and Nicita, 2007). All in all, this calls for
a general assessment of the cost and benefits of alternative organizational
arrangements, when considering their impact on competition.
Competition policy, which ranges from regulation to antitrust policy, may be
seen in that perspective as an endogenous response to failures of property
rights, implying a trade-off between owners’ rights and the collective interest
of maintaining credibility of competitive pressures and avoiding deadweight
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loss. In this respect, the design of antitrust mechanisms raises pervasive trade-
offs in at least two distinct respects. First, in the case of the provision of public
goods (like quality, reliability, knowledge, etc.), competitors need to coordina-
te (e.g. to design standard, to share useful information to ensure safety or to
avoid the collapse of markets, and so on). Cooperation can, however, lead to
collusion to capture rents. This is certainly complex to control, because these
rents can both fund the provision of the public good, and the non-justified pro-
fits of dominant positions. Secondly, in those markets characterized by fixed
costs, essential facilities, networks effects, and increasing returns, there is a
high probability of market foreclosure, enabling the capture of rents (in sta-
tics), and hindering innovation (in dynamics). This leads to the necessity to
divest integrated firms and to force opening access to essential facilities, with
the negative effects in matters of incentives to invest and transactional effi-
ciency. Tension, therefore, exists between the recommendations (drawn) from
NIE, and the « traditional » IO approach to vertical integration and to public
goods management (Williamson, 1985 ; Tirole, 1999b).
These divergences have however been considerably reducing over the years.
For instance, it has been shown that, in many cases, vertical integration or
restraints are not aimed at achieving market monopolization. Rather they seek
to reduce contractual transaction costs to the benefit of final customers
(Riordan, 1998). As outlined by the Chicago School (Posner 1976 ; Bork,
1978), other phenomena such as intra-brand competition to control quality
(Schmidt, 1994), franchising agreements to promote efficient risk-sharing
(Klein and Saft, 1985), the exclusive territories clause (Rey and Stiglitz, 1995)
and the general exclusivity clause to protect specific investments under incom-
plete contracts (Williamson 1985 ; Masten and Snyder, 1993 ; Kovacic, 2002 ;
Meese, 2005) often benefit to customers. In particular, the applied IO literatu-
re has been demonstrating for the last twenty years that practices traditionally
condemned by antitrust authorities have actual economic impacts that depend
strongly upon the competition characteristics in a given industry given the
boundaries and the dynamics of the relevant market. This calls for the specific
assessment of the actual impacts of these practices, as it has progressively
become the practice of most competition authorities worldwide. They opera-
ted a paradigmatic shift from per se rules (to be applied only in hardcore vio-
lations such as cartels and predatory pricing) towards rules of reason in
applying antitrust law (Amato, 1997 ; Kovacic and Shapiro, 2000 ; Carlton,
2007). The burden of proof for vertical restraints has also been progressively
reversed.
The evolution of antitrust law in the US and in Europe has recently registe-
red an increased convergence towards the essential and ultimate policy aim
performed by competition policy : that of protecting the process and the
mechanism of competition to foster and enhance the consumer’s welfare, and
not merely to protect or « assist » new entrants against incumbents in liberali-
zed markets (Motta and Vasconcelos, 2005). Assisted entry could indeed result
in decreased incentives to innovate to the detriment of consumers’ welfare
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(Crandall and Winston, 2003). The practical problems faced by regulators
when they have to protect the interest of consumers lies however in measuring
« the true consumer welfare standard » (Salop, 2005). It partly consists in arbi-
trating between present and future benefits. This questions, first, the discoun-
ting rate to be chosen to arbitrate between present and future values. Second
the long-term effects of scrutinized practices have to be carefully assessed. For
instance, practices adopted by incumbent firms might generate immediate
benefits to actual customers. The question is whether efficient entry is deter-
red, which would reduce consumer welfare in the long-term (e.g. Edlin, 2003 ;
Calzada and Valletti, 2008). Thus making right decision remains quite uncer-
tain.
To conclude, the regulatory authority should act as an « arbiter » in charge
of re-opening competition from time to time, especially by acting on property
rights : from rights to access to « essential facilities », to divestiture, and inclu-
ding the unbundling of right to re-open/re-organize competitive markets on
services/uses of assets that are essential in the survival of the actual competi-
tive process. His chances to make first best decisions are low. However, avoi-
ding market foreclosure is, in the long run, the only way to maintain incentives
to innovate, to reduce costs (including transactions costs), and to limit capture
of rents.
III. — THE KEY ORGANIZATIONAL DIMENSIONS
OF INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS
It is widely recognized today that institutional systems are highly complex
ensembles (Aoki, 2001). Understanding the nature of the interaction amongst
distinct institutional features and components is of crucial importance to make
sure that policies deal with interdependencies. It is also essential to anticipate
the constraints reforms deal with and the feedbacks following policy interven-
tions. The first step to analyze complexity is, however, to identify the main
dimensions of institutional design which impact on the performance of mar-
kets. Institutional design can indeed be understood as a choice of a way to
govern a type or a set of economic transactions. It therefore consists in assi-
gning governance issues amongst alternative forms or types of institutional
devices. The literature categorizes in particular four domains of choice regar-
ding institutional design : Incentives vs. Command and Control (section 3.1) ;
State vs. Self-regulation (section 3.2) ; Centralization vs. Decentralization
(section 3.3) ; Formal vs. Informal Rules (section 3.4). These robust dichoto-
mies, developed by the pioneers in the economics of institutions, are useful
and insightful. Yet, we must acknowledge that they cover only « one view of
the cathedral », and lead only to a partial analysis. Today, we have the
« bricks », but we lack the « mortar ». We benefit from the robust analyses of
the key institutional factors influencing the performance of markets. We,
however, lack a comprehensive framework to really understand the properties
of systems combining heterogeneous governance devices and made of inter-
acting systems of rules.
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3.1. Command and Control vs. Incentives
The first domain we identify refers to the pioneering debate between the
Coasean and the Pigouvian approaches (Coase, 1937, 1960, 1988 ; Pigou,
1932) to market failures. What Coase rejected was the public economics tra-
dition to rely on « automatic » state intervention, typically through constrai-
ning rules or taxation, whenever the market revealed some failure in genera-
ting efficient outcomes. Coase’s critique was twofold. First, externalities
should always be intended as inter-individual in nature, and this in turn
implies that there is no generally preferred direction of the internalization of
external effects ; whereas bargaining amongst parties may bring an efficient
allocation of costs and benefits, if transaction costs are small enough.
Secondly, standardization or tax policies should not be seen as a general poli-
cy prescription, given that, at most, they address only one aspect of the issue.
In the case of the well-known « polluter-pays » principle, the problem is that
the victims of pollution are not automatically compensated (8). Besides
Coase’s remarks, a third critique – originally raised by Tullock (1967) and
Stigler (1971) – further highlighted the existence of « bureaucratic failures »
given that command-and-control systems could always be exposed to infor-
mation asymmetries, raising principal agent problems, potential strategic
behaviors, and risks of regulatory capture by coalition among private interests,
bureaucrats and politicians.
The centrality of transaction costs in Coase’s framework also entails the
well-known trade-off between markets and hierarchy (Coase, 1937). In this
respect, the « command-and-control » type of intervention could be interpre-
ted as hierarchical, where the public decision-maker plays a forbearing role
(Williamson, 1985). According to a NIE perspective, this type of public inter-
vention should be developed when the costs of carrying out a transaction « into
the market » (« buy ») are higher than the costs of internalizing it (« make »),
a circumstance occurring when agency costs due to asymmetric information,
or enforcement costs due to assets specificity and incomplete contracting are
high enough. As Williamson (1988) outlined, while agency costs mainly refers
to ex ante incentives alignment to prevent moral hazard on unobservable
effort, enforcement costs are mainly concerned with an ex post perspective to
prevent the opportunistic renegotiation or (« hold-up ») of incomplete
(8) That is not to say that Coase’s approach was under any circumstance alternative to Pigou,
rather it aimed at widening the spectrum of tools to be applied in case of a market failure.
In Coase’s view, State command and control should be relied upon as a residual policy
tool when decentralized exchange is inhibited by insurmountable transaction costs. But
before that, State intervention could be devoted at minimizing parties transaction costs in
the market (Cheung, 1983), for instance, by reducing information costs, facilitating the
structuring of bargaining institutions and so on. This is because, the nature of dispersed
information calls for the superiority of decentralized exchange whenever it is possible.
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contracts characterized by specific investments (9). Hierarchical arrangements
are deemed to reduce, in those contexts, the degree of freedom of opportunis-
tic agents. Two trade-offs emerge. In agency problems, there is a revelation vs.
capture dilemma in cases of repeated interactions, a now well-studied issue in
the « regulation » literature (e.g. Laffont and Tirole, 1993). The « hold-up »
questions the efficient adaptation to unforeseeable contingencies when rene-
gotiation-proof contracts have been signed (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990 ;
Tadelis, 2002). The tradeoff is between « security » and « flexibility »
(Brousseau, 2008).
The literature on relational contracting can be considered as an attempt to
overcome the above strong contrast between hierarchy and market by outli-
ning that real transactions request to solve agency problems in shaping rene-
gotiation games in such a way as to restore incentive to make specific invest-
ment in context of enduring bilateral relationships (c.f. Baker, Gibbons and
Murphy, 2002). In that perspective, the development of the theory and practi-
ce of Public-Private Partnerships can be considered as a way to overcome the
traditional alternative between public and private provision of public goods
through the development of a hybrid mode of governance between some
public authority and private service providers. Relational contracting between
the sovereign (or one of its branches) and private operators raises, however,
specific issues recently surveyed by Spiller (2008) and Brousseau and Saussier
(2009). Not only private partners may attempt to cheat, especially because
they have strong incentives to over-compete in the competition for markets,
which confront them ex post with « winners curse » effects ; but also the
government and its branches have difficulties in committing themselves not to
renegotiate ex post ; which reinforces ex ante private partners’ incentives to
contractually commit to impossible conditions. PPP contracts are thus often
renegotiated, and end up by being poor levers to reach efficiency.
Neither market incentives nor administrative controls are, thus, fully effi-
cient to ensure public good provision, which includes public ordering, under
any kind of circumstances. The reduction of transaction costs in a world of
second best outcomes is thus the fil rouge, which ties together contemporary,
NIE-based, approaches to public policies. The main conclusion is that uncer-
tainties on actual and potential market conditions (prices, costs, economic
opportunities), as well as asymmetric information and limits to contractual
compliance (due to information asymmetries, but also due to incomplete pro-
perty rights, asset specificity, limits in the ability of the state to credibly com-
(9) This distinction between information and enforcement costs has shaped two different
streams of literature (Garrouste and Saussier, 2005) : while agency costs theory typically
assumes unobservability between parties with third party’s verifiability, incomplete
contracts theory is based on a framework characterized by observability between parties
and third party’s unverifiability (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978).
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mit), constrain severely any attempt to reach first best thanks to institutional
governance. On the one hand, there are « incentives failures », because tran-
saction cost considerations prevent drawing perfect and credible incentives
schemes and to mimic competition, so as to get its results when it is impos-
sible to implement. On the other hand, « command and control » (bureaucra-
tic) failures result from information (and knowledge) asymmetries that prevent
any principal to perfectly monitor an agent without granting him de facto with
some slack and to guarantee the optimality of public bureaux (see below, sec-
tion 32). This calls for the permanent combination of the two approaches to get
them to balance, each to make up for the weaknesses of the other.
3.2. Self vs. State Regulation
In a historical perspective, the contributions provided by Douglass North
further extend the Coasean framework. North (1981, 1990, 2005) and Barzel
(1997, 2002) outlined how both the performance of a public authority in pro-
viding public goods and the interaction between « public » and « self » regu-
lations explain the emergence, and persistence, of a given economic outcome.
Together with Demsetz (1967) and North and Thomas (1973), they focused on
the analysis of the emergence of a property rights system and of the role of the
State in creating the institutional environment for market exchange to prolife-
rate. What this perspective adds to the Coasean framework is the analysis of
the trade-off between the (ex ante) costs of creating a publicly guaranteed pro-
perty right system and the (ex post) costs of market exchange when property
rights are poorly defined and enforced. These analyses provided the blueprint
for a systematic investigation of the complementarities between state and self-
regulation.
Self-regulation should be the « natural » response to problems of free riding,
coordination and enforcement, where the transaction costs of regulation is
directly carried out by those agents who also benefit from coordination. The
efficiency of self-regulation relies on three interdependent grounds : motiva-
tion, information and enforcement. Motivated agents have reduced incentives
to free ride on self-regulation (since they endogeneize its benefits). Moreover,
they typically access relevant information and observe others’ behavior with
negligible errors. Finally, motivation and information increase optimal enfor-
cement and generate the desired level of deterrence. On the one hand, when
self-enforcement exists, it reduces transaction costs compared to state enfor-
cement of legal norms (Seabright, 2005 ; McLeod, 2007). On the other, self-
enforcement requires certain conditions, such as community visibility, incen-
tives to punish cheaters, which are strongly associated with small numbers of
« players ». So, self-regulation is efficient when the dimension and the « cul-
ture » of the community are sufficiently limited and shared, so as to obtain the
enforcement of cooperative rules without needing to build a formal and exter-
nal system of enforcement.
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Milgrom, North and Weingast (1990) formulated a theory of the develop-
ment of long-distance trade during the Middle Ages based on the institution of
the law merchant (Lex Mercatoria), which explains also why public ordering
was needed to enable the extension of markets and the development of anony-
mous exchange. While in small communities, members share a great deal of
information about each other’s behavior, and « reputation » acts as a deterrent
against opportunistic behavior, when communities of traders increase in size
this becomes no longer possible. Key information is lacking. Exchange can
hardly depend on trust, and in this context « reputation » can hardly serve as
an enforcement device. According to their theory, the institutions of the law
merchant rose to protect enlarged communities from the risk of opportunistic
behavior. The effectiveness of the law merchant lay in delegating the enforce-
ment of contracts to specialized judges, which enabled them to exclude chea-
ters from the market place. Thus, market participants benefited from the insu-
rance that « authorized » traders were reliable. It was a signal that it was safe,
and so economic agents had a cooperative focal point, which was reinforced
over time by reputation effects. However, anonymous exchange and the fur-
ther extension of market demanded the development of the state’s power.
Indeed, enhanced observation and information management capabilities, rein-
forced the chances of detecting cheaters (especially across distant market
places). In addition, the observable punishment of those caught cheating
through imprisonment and trials became a strong deterrent.
In recent years, this analysis has developed to highlight the complementary
nature of public and private regulations (see Brousseau and Raynaud, 2009 ;
Brousseau et al., 2010). Traditionally, the extent of private/self regulation is
bounded by the poor enforcement capabilities of private regulators. Self-regu-
lation is based on adhesions. Members of self-regulated orders compare the
costs of compliance with the benefits they draw from the regulation. They are
free to opt out of the system. They only loose the benefits associated to the
self-regulated community, whatever they are : reduced transaction costs, lower
level of risk, access to pooled resources, risk-sharing, etc. Because private
regulators usually do not have strong retaliation means at hand (or established
legitimacy to use them), they are unable to strongly deter opportunistic beha-
viors. Their ultimate means of enforcement is exclusion. This explains why
public regulators may be called upon to reinforce the power of self-regulators.
The public ruler can agree to use its power to make compliance with self-regu-
lation mandatory. This allows it to gain influence over the private regulator,
which may then recognize the supremacy of the former in matters of gover-
nance, and may comply with principles imposed by the public order. In turn,
the public regulator benefits from the expertise and the potential lower regula-
tory costs of private regulators. The main lessons to be learnt from the overall
literature are twofold : whereas the effectiveness of self-regulation is limited
by the extent of the market, the extent of the market and the efficiency of self-
regulation is limited by the effectiveness of public regulation. What does deter-
mine this effectiveness, then?
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This has been investigated by North and Thomas (1973), according to whom
« individuals must be lured by incentives to undertake the socially desirable
activities », which means that efficient institutions are those that « bring social
and private rates of return into closer parity ». Institutional framework includes
a « public authority », whose main role is that of providing « public goods »
through coercion. Government thus turns out to be an organization that
reduces – in return for a revenue or tax – the uncertainty underlying market
exchanges, by providing protection and justice through a system of basic
ground rules, laws and social customs. In North and Thomas’s view, « the dif-
ferential success of European economies after the demise of feudalism » is due
to the efficient relationship which emerged « between the nation state’s fiscal
policy and property rights ». However, this is not without a cost. Public orde-
ring is itself subject to distortions, delays and to the influence of organized
groups of pressure (North, 1981 ; 1990). Its ultimate effect will depend on the
relative bargaining power of the state’ social and political constituents
(Buchanan and Tullock, 1962 ; Weingast, 1989, North and Weingast ; 1989) or,
in other words, on the amount of the transaction costs associated with the pro-
cess of political exchange.
As North (1990, p. 52) recognizes : « the efficiency of the political market is
the key to this issue. […] Inefficiencies existed because rulers would not anta-
gonize powerful constituents by enacting efficient rules that were opposed to
their interests or because the costs of monitoring, metering, and collecting
taxes might very well lead to situations in which less efficient property rights
yielded more tax revenue(s) than efficient property rights ». Along this line,
the economic literature has deeply recurred to the historical analysis of insti-
tutions. Goldin and Libecap (1994) use case studies to defend and expand
upon the notion that elements of a civil society – « special interests » – mana-
ge to « capture » government regulators, and make the state serve their selfish
ends. The evidence suggests to them that government agents often enjoy consi-
derable autonomy in regulating civil society, and that readily manipulable cur-
rents in public opinion are also important. This claim partially reconciles the
analysis of institutions with the modern interest group theory of regulation,
developed by George Stigler (1971) and Gary Becker (1983). Their work
emphasizes the ability of organized « special interests » within civil society to
influence state policy to their own advantage. While the interest group theory
explores the circumstances under which groups are more likely to organize
and, in turn, influence public policy to serve their own narrow ends, the insti-
tutional analysis couples this approach with the investigation of the institutio-
nal and legal rules which inhibit or reinforce interest groups.
The chain of causality depicted by North (1990, p. 52) is that « rules descend
from polities to property rights to individual contracts ». There are then seve-
ral interdependent domains of choice and the dimension of transaction costs in
one domain will affect the dimension and the direction of transaction costs in
other domains : « the opportunity set of the players and the forms of organiza-
tion they devise in specific contracts will be derived from property rights
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structure », which in turns depends on polities. Again, we are in a second best
world. State norms are built though political processes that are inherently bia-
sed because the « weight » to be attributed to the various stakeholders is not
related to social economic values and to collective wealth, but it depends on
self-interested attitudes.
Thus, the tradeoff between self and public regulation depends above all on
the quality of public rule, which itself depends upon the efficiency of the poli-
tical market (i.e. its openness in matters of competition). The condition in
which it occurs is analyzed in great detail in recent contributions, especially by
North et al. (2009) and Brousseau et al. (2010). Lessons of these types of ana-
lysis in terms of the organization of markets are twofold. First, the optimal
balance between public and private/self-regulation is very sensitive to the qua-
lity of public institutions, which are country specific, and strongly influenced
by path-dependence. What is efficient in a given national context might be out-
performed by better arrangements in others. Second, the role of the public
regulator can be to organize an information competition among market stake-
holders and amongst private regulators to oversight the many and complex pri-
vate bilateral and collective governance arrangements that shape the perfor-
mance of exchanges. As pointed out by Spiller and Liao (2008), and by
Brousseau and Glachant (2010), this is, indeed, the right way to fix the infor-
mation gap faced by any public regulator dealing with any private one that
may use its regulatory and contractual capabilities to hinder competition.
3.3. Centralization vs. Decentralization
Constitutional economics and Federalism focus on the distribution of com-
petences amongst institutional components. To a large extent, this can be sum-
med up as the analysis of the tradeoffs between the centralization and the
(horizontal and vertical) decentralization of governance. Indeed, constitutional
economics is mainly devoted to outlining the pervasive trade-offs associated
to each form of limitation of powers, both in terms of horizontal (legislature,
executive, judiciary) and vertical (federal structure) division of power (Voigt,
1997, 2008). (Fiscal) federalism is about the optimal level of decentralization
of public good provision (see Tiebout, 1956 ; Oates, 1999, and 2005 ;
Weingast, 2005).
Beyond the specific analysis of political systems, the institutional question
to be dealt with in the line of this paper is whether the level/specialization of
provision of an order affects the quality and the cost of governance. The issue
is, indeed, to draw lessons to design governance systems ensuring (more) effi-
cient outcomes. Of course, this leads to review a literature focusing on public
governance, because the mode of centralization/decentralization of a State has
long been a central political question. In the following pages, we will focus on
two main types of trade-offs that are relevant for our purpose. The first one
refers to the problem of government « commitment » under the incomplete
social/political contract between the citizens and the State due, in particular, to
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risk of regulatory capture. The second one refers to the problem of optimal
decentralization (with yardstick competition amongst local levels) given the
necessity to adapt to local/market specificities, while decentralization implies
the cost of coordination and market fragmentation.
The question of governmental « commitment » is related to the incomplete
contract between citizens (including their organizations) and the State (Tirole,
1994 ; Martimort, 1996). As outlined by Weingast (1995), the problem here is
that « a government strong enough to protect property rights and enforce
contracts is also strong enough to confiscate the wealth of citizens ». One of
the outcomes of this is an adequate (vertical and horizontal) division of power
to create checks and balances aimed at avoiding regulatory capture. One of the
issues in matters of the organization of markets is the states’s sensitivity to the
influence of political parties, to lobbies’ (lobby) pressures, to biased informa-
tion provided by interest groups, to the influence of international politics. This
is the reason why competition and regulation policies are generally delegated
to independent agencies and the surrounding rules interpreted as constitutional
enactments, whose modification requires strong majorities. A « committed »
government ensures against « regulatory » hold-up (Bös and Lulfesmann,
1996), but may then undermine efficient adaptation when needed (as it is the
case of the recent revision at the EU level of antitrust rules applicable to State
aids, after the financial crisis). On the contrary, a low level of commitment
generates uncertainty over the « rules of the game », and may undermine pro-
per incentives particularly to invest. Thus, the main lesson here is that since
the performance of the State as an enforcement institution of market
exchanges depends, in turn, on the way in which the power amongst its
« constituents » is defined and allocated, it is crucial to understand the institu-
tional trade-offs affecting the emergence, stability and change of constitutions,
political parties, federal organization, governments (Levy and Spiller, 1994 ;
Spiller and Liao, 2008).
The optimal level of decentralization or of federalism has to do with « ver-
tical » division of powers, and is generally grounded on the idea of subsidiari-
ty according to which the level of « local » governance should be defined by
the institution, which minimizes costs of establishing an order. The definition
of the appropriate level at which a given governance issue should be tackled
depends on a number of dimensions in function of which the relative perfor-
mance of centralization and decentralization may be measured (Brousseau and
Raynaud, 2009). They encompass (i) the ability to meet citizens’ preferences ;
(ii) the ability to make effective use of dispersed information ; (iii) the ability
of the system to evolve through innovation ; (iv) the ability to ensure stability
of expectations/reduce legal uncertainty ; (v) the ability to internalize externa-
lities ; (vi) the ability to garner scale and scope economies ; (vii) the ability to
restrain the negative effects of rent seeking (cf. in section 2.3.3. the specific
application of this to the analysis of conflict resolution). On the one hand,
decentralization brings benefits in terms of adaptation and compliance, while
on the other, centralization enlarges the scope of markets (hence, a deeper divi-
108 REVUE D’ÉCONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE — n°129-130, 1er et 2ème trimestres 2010
sion of labor and a higher level of competition), and yields economies of scale
in governance (10). In addition, a federalist organization induces a de facto
yardstick competition among governance units in public goods provision
(Tiebout, 1956), which provides firms and citizens with the means to voice.
The main organizational cost of federalism is, however, the increasing costs of
coordination among the federalist units. Cooter, 2002 and Inman and
Rubinfeld, 1997, for instance, discuss processes to deal with this tradeoff,
which was not really addressed in the traditional federalist literature (while it
was recognized ; e.g. Tiebout, 1956 ; Oates, 1994).
In this respect, in order to limit political bias in the enforcement of antitrust
law, the general approach followed by advanced industrialized countries, has
been that of delegating to a specialized independent authority and/or to
Courts the application of the law (Deporter and Parisi, 2006) and to mix hori-
zontal and vertical division of authority. Both in the US and in Europe com-
petition policy couples Courts’ decisions with investigation by specialized
agencies, and is increasingly multi-level. This responds not only to a subsi-
diarity principle, but also to the purpose of avoiding regulatory capture and
to promote some degree of regulatory competition among the institutions
devoted to competition policy. With respect to the US, the European organi-
zation of competition has evolved with the following features (Manganelli,
Nicita, Rossi, 2009) : a high degree of centralization of law-making, which
does not exclude the existence of national laws that can be applied in speci-
fic circumstances ; a high degree of decentralization of enforcement, mitiga-
ted by a strong unifying role played by the European Commission ; the adop-
tion of formal rules of coordination meant to smooth the vertical relation-
ships among actors placed at different levels in the system (particularly the
Commission and NCAs) ; a very limited role for formal rules of coordination
in the context of horizontal relationships among NCAs and among NCAs
and national regulatory authorities ; the complementarity between public and
private enforcement.
3.4. Formal vs. Informal Rules
The analysis of the trade-off between State and self-regulation (section 3.2.)
somehow overlaps with the analysis of the differences between formal or
informal ruling. This is due to two joint circumstances. State regulation always
(10) These tradeoffs are complex as illustrated by the recent European Commission White
Paper on Private Enforcement in Antitrust Law, which aims at transplanting the US expe-
rience in this respect. The design of deterrence, sanctions and remedies under a fragmen-
ted institutional context, when ample room for divergence among the EU Commission,
National authorities and Courts exists, remains an essential issue. In particular, the rela-
tionship between sanction and remedies, and the question related to whether antitrust
sanction should be directly coupled with damage compensation towards victims or total-
ly independent from private enforcement, is under severe discussion (McAfee, Mialon and
Mialon, 2008).
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entails a public enforcement structure based on formal rules. The superiority
of self-regulation over state regulation is generally linked to the same self-
enforcing conditions (small communities, repeated interaction, shared infor-
mation) that characterize the emergence and effectiveness of informal rules.
Yet, beliefs, ideology, etc. are meta-rules that might concern very large com-
munities. We focus here on different characterization of formal vs. informal
rules than those which are encompassed by the just quoted factors, and which
draws from their origin. Whether they are imposed by force or agreed upon,
formal rules are linked to the implementation of explicit enforcement mecha-
nisms to guarantee compliance. Such rules correspond to North’s approach to
institutions as rules of the game (North, 1990). On the contrary, informal rules
are equilibrium of a « super-game » – qualified by some as the « game of
life » ; see Binmore (1994), – by which convergence of behaviors is sponta-
neously obtained, because each individual behavior is the best reply to the
behavior of others. This is the vision which has been proposed, among others,
by Aoki (2001) and Greif (2006). Such a contrast among the nature of orders
yields specific contrasts in terms of the analysis of their impact and of the pro-
cesses of evolution.
Informal rules-based institutions constitute a focal point in the social inter-
action game, while formal rules-based institutions typically rely on an ability
to reward or retaliate to impose a collective order. While the literature has ori-
ginally contrasted formal and informal rules as alternative enforcement
devices, recent contributions tend to stress the complementary relationship
between the two kinds of institutions, emphasizing the hidden role of infor-
mal institutions to explain different evolutionary paths among alternative
societies governed by comparable systems of formal rules (Djankov et al.,
2002).
From that perspective, informal norms or rules have been defined as impli-
cit social contracts that are enforced through a complex system of sanctions.
Even if never consciously designed (Sugden, 1986) they are, nonetheless,
applied by community members. Informal norms have the property of being
self-enforcing devices applied with very low transaction costs, because they
are embedded in social behavior and transferred from one member to another
through a mix of cultural heritage, shared values and organized consent (11).
The social nature of extra-legal enforcement devices somehow increases the
probability of being sanctioned when violating the rules because it is the social
network itself that acts both as a way of transmitting information and of enfor-
(11) In order to appropriately evaluate the role played by informal rules within a given institu-
tional order, a standard approach in the economic analysis of institutions has been that of
assuming a stateless society and of analyzing the emergence of endogenous enforcement
devices in that setting (Dixit, 2004). In this respect, the focus has been put on the role
played, in enhancing cooperation, by social norms and cultural beliefs (Dasgupta, 1989 ;
Gambetta, 1989 ; Kreps, 1990 ; Peyton Young, 2007), reciprocity and envy attitudes
(Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, Gintis, McElreath, and Fehr, 2001 ; Bowles, 2003).
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cing sanctions (12). Thus, in some cases social enforcement through informal
rules reduces transaction costs (as monitoring and detection) and increases the
probability of being sanctioned (13).
While repeated games models focus on the logic of long-term relationship to
explain cooperation in a bilateral framework, recent studies have shown how
informal rules rely on network of ties (Greif, 1993, Bernstein, 1992, 2001; Casella
and Rauch, 2002), through which information on reputation and trust is transmit-
ted to other members of the local group and through which formal or informal
sanctions (punishment, stigma, social pressure and so on) are implemented (14).
Focusing on the network of ties surrounding implicit cooperation as a distin-
guishing feature of informal rules leads to outline the stability of informal sys-
tems of rules. Thus, informal rules emerging to solve a problem of coordination
may persist over time as equilibria even if the social cost of endogenous enfor-
cement becomes higher than the social benefit of maintaining them. This is due
to switching costs for each individual, and to the fact that a general agreement
among all individuals complying with a norm to switch at the same time to a new
equilibrium is difficult to realize. Resistance to change has then been defined as
a distinguishing feature of formal vis-à-vis informal rules. As Bowles and Naidu
(2004) outlined, informal rules maintain, with respect to formal ones, a sort of
asymmetric time span : a much longer time is needed to create informal rules with
respect to that required to destroy or to change the rules when established (15).
(12) Think of the role of social stigma as a sanction (Kahan and Posner, 1999 ; Funk, 2004 ;
Link and Phelan 2001) : social stigma acts as an extra legal sanction but also – when
observable – providing information on other members of the society and inducing them to
adopt a conformist behavior against the deviant.
(13) The cost of informal orders is, however, that they limit the exchange to the network of ties
previously highlighted. They limit, therefore, the division of labor in two ways. First,
exchanges must be based on personal relationships along these networks of ties. Second,
informal norms limit the complexity of agreements. Highly sophisticated deals and tran-
saction which are out of reach (see Brousseau et al., 2010) are poor protection in cases of
complex exchanges.
(14) An important feature of informal orders is their ability to generate the so-called multi-
dimensional enforcement, which means that informal rules may recur to several forms of
retaliation or rewards as the network of « local » ties increases. In multilateral setting
punishment in one dimension or in one domain could be used to deter cheating in another
(Pénard, 2008). This multidimensional structure of informal rules thus configures a
« community norm as an equilibrium of linked games » (Aoki, 2001).
(15) This is the reason why a high correlation between informal rules and early stage of econo-
mic development has been outlined by many scholars. As Trebilcock and Leng (2006) recent-
ly outlined, with low levels of economic development, informal contract enforcement
mechanisms may be reasonably good substitutes for formal contract, obtaining the same
enforcement level with much lower transaction costs, « but they become increasingly imper-
fect substitutes at higher levels of economic development involving large, long-term, highly
asset-specific investments or increasingly complex traded goods and services, especially out-
side repeated exchange relationships ». As market transactions grow in dimension, com-
plexity and trade, informal rules appear to lose their superiority in favor of formal rules.
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While formal institutions can be modified at the cost of political bargaining
without automatically decreasing their enforcement power, informal ones,
because they are coordination equilibria within wide communities submitted
to coordination failures, are inclined to resist to external and internal pressure,
as an implicit survival strategy, but then they tend to dramatically fall when
remarkable shocks occur. The pace of evolution is then characterized by infre-
quent, but brutal changes (see Brousseau, Garrouste, Raynaud, 2010).
The issue with this disconnection in terms of pace of evolution is that insti-
tutional reforms are difficult to manage because formal and informal rules
jointly operate at the same time (Lin, 2003 ; North, 2005).
Moreover, since formal institutions are more « malleable » they tend to focus
the attention or policy makers and scholars. This « gives us an inadequate and
frequently misleading notion about the relationship between formal constraints
and performance » (Dixit, 2004). Informal rules are often enforced in the sha-
dow of the law, and informal contracts are « signed » even in institutional
context in which Courts act as a last resort option of conflicts resolution.
Formal rules and public orderings act as default options in ex post bargaining
among litigants. When there is a risk of a wrong decision by a third party due
to lack of information, parties prefer to avoid going to Court, and rely on pri-
vate ordering solution. In a context in which the relative efficiency of alterna-
tive formal institutions is context dependent, it is complex to analyze institu-
tional performance, and to decide what reforms should be undertaken. This
leads to the critiques often being addressed to international organizations such
as the World Bank, which attempts to implement formal institutions, because
they have proven efficient in other societal contexts.
CONCLUSION: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
AND ITS GOVERNANCE
The main lesson from this attempt to highlight the lessons to be drawn from
NIE in matters regarding the building of market supporting institutions is the
« second best » nature of real-world institutions. Institutions are complex in
nature and the design of institutions should take into account such complexity
when attempting to enhance economic performance. In that perspective, the
above described « bricks », allow an analysis of the various fundamental tra-
deoffs that characterize the design of institutional frameworks. They enable
scholars and decision-makers to clarify a number of debates that have to be
dealt with when trying to enhance market performance in an economy.
However, additional analyses have to be developed, specifically because the
interplay among institutional components and the optimal mixes among insti-
tutional tools and principles of institutional design have to be clarified. This
calls for the development of more systematic analyses of complementarities
among institutional components. In NIE’s present state of development, know-
ledge on the subject is clearly quite rudimentary. This hinders the ability to
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conceive the design of institutional systems, since only very partial/rough
solutions to identified issues can be proposed, with strong uncertainty about
whether they can be implemented and about their actual impact.
More generally, scholars like Aoki, Bowles, Dixit, Greif, Nelson, North,
Winter, Weingast, to quote a few of those who have investigated issues related
to processes of institutional evolutions, insist on path-dependency in matters
of institutional change (see the survey proposed by Kingston and Caballero,
2009 and Brousseau, Garrouste and Raynaud, 2010). This triggers the question
of how difficult it is to manage institutional change through reforms, both
because some institutional components – like informal institutions – are out of
the reformer’s control, and because it is complex to coordinate the evolutiona-
ry processes of various institutional components. Moreover, individual agents
develop initiatives to compensate for the loopholes in institutional frame-
works. It is difficult to anticipate them and to control their consequences. The
conditions for institutional change and the diversity of institutional evolutions
should therefore be investigated more deeply in order to understand the condi-
tions needed for the wished-for evolution to occur, and to learn how to mana-
ge reforms.
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